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Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional
Analysis of a Norplant/Depo-Provera
Welfare Condition
KIMBERLY A. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
The new technology in birth control, along with the recent experimentation of state
welfare plans, raises the question of whether government-promoted sterilization
through the use of this new birth control could be part of a constitutionally sound
welfare policy. The two new forms of birth control are Norplant, which involves the
insertion of six silicone rubber tubes containing synthetic progestin hormones into a
woman's upper arm, and Depo-Provera, which involves the injection of progestin
medroxyprogesterone acetate hormones into a woman's buttocks or upper arm.2 Both
methods offer women longer lasting, more effective, and verifiable birth control that
essentially "sterilizes" their ability to become pregnant for a limited time period The
incorporation of these forms of birth control into a welfare program, however, raises
some very important legal and constitutional issues.
This Note addresses these issues and considers whether a welfare plan that offers
recipients the option to receive an additional benefit on the condition that they take
either Norplant or Depo-Provera would be found legally permissible.4 Most legal
analyses of this welfare condition have concluded that conditioning the receipt of an
additional benefit on the temporary waiver of an individual's right to have a child is
constitutionally impermissible.5 The basis of their conclusion, however, has fallen
almost exclusively on the relationship between the right to procreate and the
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to extend my gratitude to my father, Tom W. Smith, for helping me develop this topic and for
his editorial reviews of my Note. Thanks also to Professor Patrick L. Baude for reviewing my
Note and for his thoughtful comments and suggestions. Additionally, thanks to Professor
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1. Darci Elaine Burrell, The Norplant Solution: Norplant and the Control of African-
American Motherhood, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 401,402 (1995).
2. American Academy of Family Physicians, Depo-Provera: An Injectable Contraceptive
(1999), at http://www.familydoctor.org/handouts/043.html.
3. See id.; see also Burrell supra note 1, at 402.
4. This Note refers to this proposed welfare plan as "the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare
condition." Please notice the emphasis on the word "additional"; this welfare condition is only
proposing that recipients be given the option to receive an extra benefit rather than
conditioning their receipt of welfare payments in general on the use of birth control. See infra
Part III.B.
5. See, e.g., David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 193 (1992); Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine and Mandating Norplant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 15, 33-37 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman:
Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 931, 931-32 (1995).
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Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.6 Moreover, these analyses of the right to
procreate are flawed in two respects: (1) they fail to recognize the potential
implications that the Supreme Court's decision inPlannedParenthoodv. Casey5 may
have on cases involving reproductive rights and (2) they fail to assert why privacy
rights involving reproductive matters are different from the privacy rights that may
be limited upon the receipt of welfare benefits. In addition, most of their legal
arguments have overlooked the sterilization aspect of these conditions-specifically,
the vast differences that exist between this new form of temporary sterilization and
the traditional methods of sterilization.
This Note specifically focuses on the issues implicated by the Norplant/Depo-
Provera welfare condition and concludes that this welfare condition may be
constitutionallypermissible 8 Essentially, thepermissibility of conditioning the receipt
of an extra welfare benefit on the agreement of temporary sterilization through one
of these two forms of birth control raises two constitutional questions: (1) whether
the traditional analysis of sterilization applies to these modem forms of temporary
sterilization and (2) whether a Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition violates an
individual's constitutional right to procreate. Both of these issues entail a larger
question of whether the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition could be
constitutional under the Doctrine.9 This Note examines these issues to determine
ultimately under what circumstances a Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition
could be permissible.
The basis of Parts I and II of this Note is the Supreme Court's opinion in Skinner
v. Oklahoma."° Part I focuses on the sterilization issues raised in this case. More
specifically, this Part considers the case law, philosophy, and methods of traditional
sterilization in comparison to the modem forms of sterilization. The goal is to
determine whether the modem forms of temporary, medical sterilization through the
6. See, e.g., Coale, supra note 5, at 204; Nolan, supra note 5, at 36; Roberts, supra note
5, at 931-32. The Doctrine holds that the government may not offer a benefit where acceptance
of this-benefit directly or indirectly restricts the recipient's constitutional right. Nolan, supra
note 5, at 17. See also infra Part III.
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. The focus of this Note is to discuss the constitutional issues raised by the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition and to determine whether this type of welfare
condition could be constitutionally permissible based on current law. Therefore, while the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition mayalso raise some morality and religious questions,
this Note is limited to a discussion of the relevant legal and constitutional issues.
9. Some legal scholars believe the Doctrine should be abandoned. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (with Particular
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 595 (1990) (arguing that
the Doctrine should be replaced with direct questions of whether "the government has
constitutionally sufficientjustifications for affecting constitutionally protected interests"); see
also infra note 124. This Note, however, regards the Doctrine as the major threshold to the
permissibility of the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition for the following reasons: (1)
the Doctrine has not been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court, and (2) this Doctrine has
been utilized in recent Supreme Court decisions regarding reproductive/privacy rights.
10. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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use of Norplant and Depo-Provera require a modified analysis of the traditional
scrutiny of permanent, surgical sterilization." Part 1[ then reviews Skinner in regard
to its influence on the establishment of a right to procreate and the subsequent case
law that has since considered reproductive decisionmaking rights. In addition to
arguing that the applicable standard for restrictions on reproductive rights is unclear,
Part II reviews the existing permissible limitations on some of the privacy rights of
welfare recipients. Part III then addresses whether the sterilization and procreation
aspects ofthe Norplant/Depo-Proverawelfare conditions violate the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine.
I. STERILIZATION
The proposal to offer women additional welfare bonuses on the condition that they
use either Norplant or Depo-Provera inevitably means women must agree to
temporary sterilization while they are on welfare in order to receive an extra bonus.
While mention of the word "sterilization" alone causes alarm and feelings of
uneasiness, many are starting to view the new methods of birth control as a means of
promoting family responsibility and as a viable solution to the welfare problem. This
Part argues that the vast differences between this new form and the old form of
sterilization warrant a fresh analysis of the sterilization issue. Specifically, the case
law, philosophy, and methods of traditional sterilization are reviewed to determine
whether the rationale against traditional sterilization also applies to the modem birth
control forms of sterilization.
A. The Supreme Court's Response to Sterilization
The first Supreme Court response to sterilization was in Buck v. Bell2 in 1927,
where the Court upheld the sterilization of a "feeble minded white woman."'3 The
Court held that the state sterilization law was not unconstitutional and did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.'4 At the time this decision was made, the states viewed
the decision not only as indicating the Court's acceptance of the already thousands
of sterilizations of mentally ill or retarded individuals, but also as indicating its
If. Norplant and Depo-Provera require medical assistance [hereinafter referred to as
"medical" or "nonsurgical" sterilization]. Norplant requires the insertion ofsix silicone rubber
tubes just beneath the skin of a woman's upper arm. Burrell, supra note 1, at 402. Depo-
Provera requires the injection of a progestin type hormone. American Academy of Family
Physicians, supra note 2. Conversely, traditional sterilization involved a surgical procedure
[hereinafter referred to as "surgical" sterilization]. Castration involved the surgical removal of
a male's testicles. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DiCTIoNARY 299 (27th ed. 2000). A vasectomy
required an excision of a major organ of the male. Id. at 1932. A hysterectomy was the removal
of a female's uterus. Id. at 867. An oopherectomy was the removal of a female's ovaries. Id.
at 1263.
12. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
13. Id. at 205.
14. Id. at 207.
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allowance of the tens of thousands of sterilizations yet to be performed. 5 In the
aftermath ofthis decision, the number of individuals sterilized reached its peak during
the 1930s.16
The Supreme Court's next and most recent ruling on the constitutionality of a state
sterilization law was in 1942 in Skinner v. Oklahoma.7 The Court held that the
sterilization of criminal habitual offenders was not constitutionallypermissible."' The
Court stated that the implication of the right to procreate in sterilization required
"strict scrutiny of the classification [that] a State makes in a sterilization law."'9
Moreover, the Court emphasized the potential "far-reaching and devastating effects"
that the power to sterilize entailed and stressed that the reckless use of this power
could cause "races or types [that] are inimical to the dominant group to wither and
disappear."2 °
As a result of this opinion, many legal scholars view the Skinner decision as
signaling the end of sterilization.2' The Court's decision, however, was based on very
"narrow grounds and did not overrule Buck."' Moreover, despite the Court
essentially prohibiting the enactment of other habitual sterilization laws, the existing
state policy that advanced the sterilization of institutionalized, noncriminal
individuals remained in effect.' While the Court's declaration that sterilization
"forever deprive[s] [individuals] ofabasic liberty" in part triggered the eventual end
of the involuntary sterilization era, the question remains whether this almost sixty-
year-old rationale against sterilization demands strict scrutiny,25 and thus effectively
prohibits the use of modem sterilization. Additionally, the Court's decision in 197826
15. See PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (199 1).
16. Id. at xiii. Within a few years of the Buck decision, the number of procedures
performed increased and the number of states with sterilization laws rose to thirty. Id. at 87.
17. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18.Id. at 535.
19.Id. at 541.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., REILLY, supra note 15, at 128.
22. Id.; see also Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-41.
23. See REILLY, supra note 15, at 129.
24. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
25. To satisfy the strict scrutiny test, the regulation or classification must be necessary to
serve a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw PRINCIPLEs AND POLICIES 416 (Aspen Law & Business
1997). Alternatively, satisfaction of rational basis review only requires the regulation or
classification to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 415.
26. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 358 (1978). This case involved the mother of a
mentally incompetent woman petitioning the court to have her daughter involuntarily sterilized.
Id. at 349. Despite no statutory language on this subject, the judge granted the sterilization. Id.
The daughter was secretly sterilized, and upon determination of the sterilization years later she
filed suit. Id. The focus of the Court in Stump was whether a judge had judicial authority to
grant sterilization absent statutory authorization, not on the legality of court-ordered
sterilization. Id. at 356-57.
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that sterilization could be authorized absent express statutory permission has led to
numerous cases ordering the sterilization of mentally incompetent individuals based
on the common law parens patriae doctrine."
B. Traditional Sterilization
While the Supreme Court's stance against sterilization in Skinner is clear, a
complete understanding of the emergence and eventual decline of sterilization is
necessary to determine the viability of modem sterilization. Through a review of the
philosophy, the methods, and the motive for the sterilization laws during the first half
of the twentieth century, this section considers whether the exceptionality of these
factors warrants a fresh analysis of the modem forms of sterilization that exist today.
1. The Philosophy Behind the Rise and Fall of the
Sterilization Era
The first trace of sterilization ideology dates back to Darwinism when Charles
Darwin in 1859 introduced the theory that human traits and behavior are inherited.'
From this notion of inherited traits, the eugenic movement emerged in the early
twentieth century arguing that unfitness was hereditary.' Eugenicists proclaimed
"insanity and feeble-mindedness were expressions of mental degeneracy and that
criminals were moral degenerates." '3 Through these classifications, state sterilization
laws were implemented, and the practice of sterilizing these so-called inferior beings
emerged. The first state to pass a sterilization law was Indiana, in 1907. 3' By 1922,
fourteen more states had enacted sterilization laws, and pursuant to those laws, 3,233
individuals had been sterilized.32 The Supreme Court's decision in Buck in 1927
"signaled a new era in eugenics. '3  By the early 1930s, the number of states with
sterilization laws almost doubled the number in 1922, and the practice of sterilization
increased dramatically to its peak in the mid-1930s.
34
For a number of reasons, however, sterilization began to decline in the 1940s: (1)
sterilization became a lower priority when physicians were sent off to fight in World
War II, which gave the opponents of sterilization an opportunity to speak against it
27. Roberta Cepko, Involuntary Sterilization ofMentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L. 122, 157-58 (1993). "Parens patriae power is an 'inherent authority' of a court
'to protect those persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because of a legal
disability."' Id. at 158 n.245 (quoting In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381-82 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982)).
28. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE 5 (1988).
29. Id. at 2.
30. REILLY, supra note 15, at 5.
31. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1433 (1981) (citing Act of March 9, 1907, 1907 Ind. Acts ch. 215).
32. REILLY, supra note 15, at 45, 48-49.
33. Id. at 88.
34. See id. at 96-97.
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more loudly;3" (2) the Supreme Court's decision in Skinner in 1942 essentially
precluded the enactment of habitual criminal sterilization laws and emphasized the
right of procreation; 6 and (3) the civil rights movement and a newfound support for
human rights emerged after the public witnessed the killings of Jews by Adolf Hitler
during World War Hl.3" Nonetheless, in the 1960s involuntary eugenic sterilization
was still in existence in over twenty-five states. 8 The publication in 1978 of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's ("HEW") rules prohibiting federal
funding of sterilization under certainprograms, however, triggered the repeal of many
of these state sterilization laws or at least a substantial decrease in the states'
practice.39
2. The Targets and Methods of Traditional Sterilization
The main advocates of sterilization were eugenicists. As discussed above, they
branded the mentally ill, the retarded, and criminals as unfit.4" They believed
sterilizing, and thus preventing the so-called unfit beings from passing their
feeblemindedness on to their child, was a necessity for the good of the public
welfare.9
The procedure required the individuals to undergo major surgery that was
dangerous and that resulted in permanent sterilization.42 Men were initially sterilized
by castration, which involved the surgical removal of the testicles."3 Castration was
replaced with the new procedure of a vasectomy in the 1890s." While the vasectomy
was a simpler and safer procedure, it still involved surgery of a major organ with
permanent effects. 5 Before the development of tubal ligation, which is the blocking
of the fallopian tubes, women were sterilized in one of two procedures: hysterectomy,
the removal of the uterus, or oopherectomy, removal of the ovaries.'
Ultimately, during the sterilization era of the first half of the twentieth century,
35. Id. at 128.
36. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also supra notes 17-25 and
accompanying text.
37. See Karl A. Menninger, Proof of Qualification for Sterilization of a Person with a
Mental Disability, 49 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 7 (1998); see also REILLY, supra note 15,
at 128.
38. REILLY, supra note 15, at 148.
39. See id. at 152.
40. See supra text accompanying note 30.
41. See REILLY, supra note 15, at 2-5, 9-11.
42. While the success of reversing some of these procedures has grown substantially in
the last few decades, these procedures were considered permanent and irreversible during the
first half of the twentieth century. See 21 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Sexual Sterilization §§ 8,
14(1968).
43 Menninger, supra note 37, § 5.
44. TRoMBLEY, supra note 28, at 50.
45. Id.
46. Menninger, supra note 37, § 4.
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over 60,000 individuals were involuntarily sterilized. 7 The procedures were
dangerous, permanent, and caused serious side effects. Those individuals had no
option; the sterilization was forced. Their perceived inferiority was due to their
alleged mental deficiency or criminal tendencies. These individuals were not
considered just "unfit to procreate"; "their kind" were viewed as "unfit to live." This
is what sterilization was; this is what people think of when they hear the word
"sterilization"; and this is why the Supreme Court stressed the "devastating effects"4
of sterilization.
C. New Technology Demands a New Rationale
Optional, temporary, and medical sterilization of today is nothing like the forced,
surgical sterilization of yesterday.49 This section illustrates the modem philosophy
and methods of sterilization and compares them to the traditional era. The large
differences between the modem and traditional era, in addition to the outdated
rationale against sterilization in Skinner, demand a new look at the constitutionality
of sterilization.
1. Modem Philosophy
The number of welfare recipients staying on welfare for longer periods and not
becoming financially self-sufficient has been a continuing concern over the last
couple decades." While the public has always lent support to helping the poor
become economically self-sufficient, the public has become displeased with the lack
of family responsibility among the welfare recipients.5 While the public does not
view these individuals as feebleminded, criminal, or mentally deficient, a growing
number believe that welfare recipients should not have children while they are on
welfare due solely to their inability to be financially self-supporting."
The modem classification that individuals should not have children while they are
on welfare is not based on any personal or inheritable quality. Rather, this objective,
economic classification is based on welfare recipients' inability to provide for their
current family without the assistance of federal funds.53 This is a far cry from the
philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which based its classifications
of "unfit" individuals on their purported inheritable, inferior traits of
feeblemindedness and mental deficiencies.' While the goal of traditional sterilization
47. REiLLY, supra note 15, at 94.
48. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
49. See supra text accompanying note 11.
50. A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship with the Working Poor, 51
HASTINGS L.J. 17, 17-19 (1999).
51. Id. at 21-27.
52. See Laura M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 637 (1995).
53. Anne-Marie Funk, Note, Norplant Use in Conjunction with the Welfare System, 2 S.
CAL. INTERDIscIPuNARY L.J. 147, 151-53 (1993).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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was to eliminate a class of unfit beings by taking away their ability to have
offspring,5 the goal of today's sterilization is to promote family responsibility and
to encourage welfare recipients to wait to have children until they are economically
capable of raising them.'
2. Modem Technology: Norplant and Depo-Provera
The advancement in birth control with the introduction of Norplant and Depo-
Provera in the last decade puts a new twist in the old debate on sterilization by
offering a less-intrusive, short-term method of sterilization for the purpose of
encouraging family responsibility. Moreover, while the traditional methods involved
surgery, dangerous side effects, and irreversible results,' the modem forms are
medical, temporary, and involve only minor side effects."
Norplant was approved by the Federal Drug Administration ("FDA") as a form of
birth control in 1990.1' It involves the insertion of six silicone rubber tubes, which are
implanted beneath the skin of the inner part of the woman's upper arm.' These tubes
are about the size ofa matchstick and are barely visible under the skin." The insertion
of the tubes takes only about fifteen minutes and requires the woman only to be under
a local anesthetic.' 2 The tubes contain synthetic progestin hormones that are released
in the bloodstream, causing temporary sterilization for up to five years.' In a simple
procedure, Norplant can be removed at any time, and one's fertility will return at a
normal rate within months.'
While the effectiveness of Norplant is not absolute, the rate of error is only about
0.2 to 1.5 pregnancies per 100 women per year."' The effectiveness of the birth
control is not dependent on anyone, except for its removal, which requires medical
assistance." The side effects of Norplant are relatively minimal due to the low-
55. See supra text accompanying note 41.
56. See Funk, supra note 53, at 151-53.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 59-81.
59. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, Norplant Approved (Dec. 10, 1990),
available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00027.html [hereinafter Norplant
Approved].
60. Burrell, supra note 1, at 402.
61. Norplant Approved, supra note 59.
62. Meredith Blake, Welfare and Coerced Contraception: Morality Implications ofState
Sponsored Reproductive Control, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 311, 329 (1995-96).
63. Norplant Approved, supra note 59.
64. Coale, supra note 5, at 189; see also James H. Taylor, Court-Ordered Contraception:
Norplant as a Probation Condition in Child Abuse, 44 FLA. L. REV. 379, 384 (1992). The
removal of Norplant, however, has been described as a "longer, more difficult process than
implantation." Nolan, supra note 5, 20-21 (citing WYETH-AYERST LAIBORATORIES, WOULD
You LIKE UP TO 5 YEARS OFCONTmUOUS BIRTH CONTROL THAT Is REVERSIBLE? (1992)).
65. Taylor, supra note 64, at 384.
66. Unlike the birth control pill, which a woman must take daily in order ensure its
effectiveness against pregnancy, the effectiveness of Norplant does not require any additional
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dose hormone utilized The most common side effect that arises, however, is
abnormal menstrual patterns and bleeding.68 Less common side effects include
headaches, nausea, nervousness, and dizziness.69 Another downside to Norplant in
regard to a proposal for Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare conditions is the restricted
use by certain types of women. Women experiencing abnormal vaginal bleeding or
who suffer from liver disease, breast cancer, or blood clots should not use Norplant."
Unlike the birth control pills, however, older women, women who smoke, and women
who have high blood pressure are able to use Norplant.
7
In 1992, the FDA approved Depo-Provera as a form of birth control.' While
Norplant involved a minor medical procedure, Depo-Provera is an injection in the
buttocks or upper arm of synthetic progestin medroxyprogesterone acetate
hormones. The hormones enter the bloodstream and block pregnancy for three
months.74 This method is 99.6% effective.75
A minor inconvenience of Depo-Provera is the initial irregular menstrual period
or spotting. 6 However, this side effect is only temporary, and a woman's menstrual
period completely stops after twelve months.' Other side effects that some women
steps once it has been inserted into a woman's arm. See Nolan, supra note 5, at 21. In addition,
the requirement of medical assistance to remove the tubes assures the government that any
forgetfulness or intentional actions by a woman using Norplant will not disturb its
effectiveness.
67. Taylor, supra note 64, at 384.
68. Rachel Stephanie Arnow, The Implantation of Rights: An Argument for
Unconditionally Funded Norplant Removal, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 20 (1996); see
also Norplant Approved, supra note 59; Engender Health, Norplant Implants: Questions &
Answers, available at http://www.engenderhealth.org.wh/fp/Cnor2.htm1#advantages (last
visited Oct 1, 2001).
69. Nolan, supra note 5, at 21.
70. Taylor, supra note 64, at 384-85 (citing Marian Segal, Norplant: Birth Control at
Arm's Reach, FDA CONSUMER, May 1991, at 11).
71. These types of women may use Norplant because it does not contain the hormone
estrogen, which is contained in birth control pills. American Academy of Family Physicians,
supra note 2.
72. J.M. Lawrence, The Safe (and Secret) Option; Injection a Popular Choice For Birth
Control, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 18, 1998, at 003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
BHERLD File.
73. American Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 2.
74. William Green, Consumer-Directed Advertising of Contraceptive Drugs: The FDA,
Depo-Provera and Product Liability, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 553 (1995).
75. Toni Driver Saunders, Comment, Banning Motherhood: An RX to Combat Child
Abuse?, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 203, 239 (1994).
76. See American Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 2.
77. Pharmacia & Upjohn, About Depo-Provera, available at http://www.depo-
provera.com/consumer/about.depo/expect.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). "The reason your
period stops is because Depo-Provera causes a resting state in your ovaries. When your ovaries
do not release an egg each month, the growth of your uterus does not occur. So menstrual
bleeding does not occur...." Id.
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have reported include "nervousness, dizziness, stomach discomfort, headache, and
fatigue."' Although side effects are rare and generally only minimal,79 one drawback
to using Depo-Provera is that it cannot be reversed immediately and one must wait
until the hormone level subsides.80 Another restriction ofDepo-Provera is that women
who have unexplained periods, breast cancer, blood clots, liver disease, or a history
of a stroke should not use this form of birth control."'
Overall, the nonsurgical procedure, the temporary effectiveness, and only minimal
side effects ofNorplant and Depo-Provera establish that this new type of sterilization
is significantly different from the traditional forms of sterilization. In addition to
these technical distinctions, the implementation of the Norplant/Depo-Provera
welfare condition would vary considerably from the traditional forced sterilization.
The use of Norplant and/or Depo-Provera would not be mandated-rather, the
woman will have the self-selected option82 to balance the low risk of any side effects
with the opportunity to gain additional bonuses. Moreover, use of these types of
birth control is consistently growing more popular and widespread among the
public." Thus, the public's perception of these forms of birth control is bound to be
vastly more favorable than it was of traditional sterilization.
The significance of these differences in philosophy and methods of sterilization
is further recognized by a review of the Supreme Court's remarks about sterilization
in Skinner. The Court feared the elimination of a class and emphasized the
"irreparable injury."8 5 These are not realistic fears of modem sterilization. Under the
current federal welfare program, 6 welfare recipients may only be on welfare for a
maximum of five years over the course of their lifetime.87 Hence, at most, welfare
recipients may delay their decision to procreate for five years. This delay does not
78.Id.
79. See id. (asserting that "[a] woman using Depo-Provera sometimes experiences
symptoms similar to women using other forms of birth control ... ").
80. See American Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 2 ("Depo-Provera [ works
for three months." If a woman chooses not to get another shot at the end of the three months,
"her normal ovarian function will return after a short time."); see also Pharmacia & Upjohn,
About Depo-Provera, available at
http://www.depo-provera.com/consumer/about..depo/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002)
("Most women who want to become pregnant after stopping Depo-Provera are able to do so
within I year of their last injection.").
81. See Pharmacia & Upjohn, About Depo-Provera, available at http://www.depo-
provera.com/aboutlindex.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
82. This option will only be available when use of Norplant and/or Depo-Provera is
medically suitable. Thus, women that fall within the restricted categories will not have this
option. See supra text accompanying notes 70 & 81.
83. For a discussion of the varying types of bonuses that may be offered, see infra Part
III.B.2.
84. Kristin Elliot, Are US. Women Interested in Long-Acting Methods?, 32 FAM. PLAN.
PERsp. 306, 306 (2000).
85. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
86. Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"), enacted in 1996, is the current
federal welfare program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (Supp. V 1999).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2001).
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equate with the Supreme Court's fear of a class being eliminated or their
classification of sterilization as having irreversible effects.8 First, there is no class.
The only universal characteristic that welfare recipients lack in comparison with the
rest of the country is their financial status. More importantly, the effects of Norplant
and Depo-Provera are not "farreaching [or] devastating," '89 nor do they "forever
deprive[]"' individuals of their ability to have children. Moreover, these forms of
birth control have been proven to be safe and cause few side effects. While these
forms of birth control may not be a viable option for all recipients due to health
problems, many women do not encounter any significant side effects from their use
of Norplant or Depo-Provera.
Therefore, based on this review of the traditional and modem philosophies and
methods of sterilization, the extreme differences necessitate reconsideration of
sterilization in the modem era. Part II focuses on the decision in Skinner in regard to
its emphasis on an individual's right to procreate, and then reviews subsequent case
law on related topics to determine whether a Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare
condition violates a fundamental right.
H. THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE AND PRIVACY INTERESTS
In addition to raising concerns about the permissibility of temporary sterilization,
the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition also evokes criticism due to the
procreation element involved in this condition.9 The Supreme Court in Skinner v.
Oklahoma' introduced the right to procreate as a fundamental right by emphasizing
that this right is "one of the basic civil rights of man."93 Additionally, opponents of
this welfare condition assert that dicta in Supreme Court cases dealing with
contraception and abortion implicitly have protected this right of procreation.
A. Support for the Right to Procreate
The Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut5 established the notion of a
"penumbra" of rights that protects an individual's privacy rights from government
intrusion.' The Court found that an individual's right to contraception was one of
these rights and struck down a statute making the use of contraception criminal.97
88. While a woman taking birth control may consider its effects irreversible and long
lasting due to her moral and/or religious beliefs, the point of this section is to establish that the
use of Norplant or Depo-Provera does not equate with the effects the Supreme Court was
specifically dealing with in Skinner. See supra text accompanying note 8.
89. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying note 5.
92. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
93. Id. at 541.
94. Taylor, supra note 64, 3 86-90.
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. Id. at 484-86.
97. Id. at 485.
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When a subsequent statute attempted to restrict the use of contraception to only
married couples, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird98 struck down the statute on equal
protection grounds, arguing the right to privacy included "[an individual's right] to
be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child."' The application of strict
scrutiny in these privacy matters was clearly established by the Court in Carey v.
Population Services International"" when the Court stated that "the teaching of
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of child-
bearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."''
Despite the Court's recognition that some privacy rights are protected, the Court
has not provided a clear analysis of why some rights receive more protection than
other rights do. Moreover, it is not clear what would constitute an "unjustified
intrusion by the state,""0 2 or for that matter, a justified intrusion by the state. For
instance, is a government's regulation of a protected right less intrusive when an
individual calls upon the government for assistance?
B. The Effect of the "Undue Burden" Standard
The Court's most recent decision on theseprivacy-based, reproductive rights opens
the possibility that the standard of review utilized in cases involving reproductive
decisionmaking remains a question until the Court addresses the specific matter. For
instance, after holding that the right to an abortion was a fundamental right requiring
strict scrutiny in Roe v. Wade, 3 the Court reexamined this right and applied a new
standard of review in PlannedParenthoodofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey."
While the Court expressly upheld its decision in Roe," 5 the Court in Casey refrained
from calling the right to abortion a fundamental right. Moreover, Casey did not apply
strict scrutiny, which requires the state's interest to be compelling and necessary to
meet the state's interest; rather, the Court applied a new "undue burden" test." This
test essentially holds that "[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on
a woman's ability to make [the decision whether to abort] does the power of the State
reach into the heart of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."" 7 Moreover, the
Court stated that a state regulation constitutes an "undue burden" only if the
regulation "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' 8'
Whether the Court will limit the use of the undue burden test to abortion cases is
98. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
99. Id. at 453.
100. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
101. Id. at 687.
102. Id.
103.410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
104. 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
105. Id. at 846.
106. Id. at 878-79.
107. Id. at 874.
108. Id. at 877.
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unclear. The fact that the right to abort inevitably involves the right not to bear a child
raises the possibility that future restrictions on affirmative reproductive rights may
be permissible if they only create an incidental effect, as opposed to an undue burden,
on the privacy right at issue."° If the undue burden standard was applied to the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition, the optional, temporary nature of the
condition indicates a strong possibility that any resulting restriction would only be
incidental."o This welfare condition does not require recipients to take birth control
and thus not have children. The burden on a woman's right to procreate is only a
temporary restriction, and this restriction only occurs if a woman opts to take
Norplant or Depo-Provera. Even if the standard applied in Casey is not specifically
extended to the welfare condition, this case certainly demonstrates the Court's
willingness to reconsider, and in some cases modify, its prior analysis as it is faced
with new aspects of reproductive rights and the continual struggle to define the right
of privacy.
C. Permissible Restrictions on Privacy
Rights of Welfare Recipients
The element of procreation in the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition poses
the question of how the Court will deal with the temporary limitations that this
condition imposes on a woman's procreation right, provided she makes the choice to
opt into this condition. For instance, does the fact that welfare recipients call upon the
government for support warrant more lenience in the government's ability to impose
limitations on the recipient's reproductive decisions? The Supreme Court has rejected
the argument that "conditions on food stamps or welfare payments unconstitutionally
burden rights to speech, expressive association, intimate association, or freedom from
unwarranted searches.""' More specifically, the Court upheld the government
conditioning the "receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) on [a]
recipient's submission to warrantless searches of [their] home" as a matter of free
109. In Casey the Supreme Court created the undue burden standard to permit some
limitations on a woman's right to have an abortion, or her right not to have a child. See id.
Moreover, the fact that an abortion decision inevitability contains the right not to have children
raises two questions: (1) Does Casey set a new standard for cases involving the right not to
have children, or even more broadly, cases involving reproductive decisions in general? If this
is the case, then the future validity of the strict scrutiny standard in Griswold and the other
prior contraception cases is uncertain, and (2) Does Casey simply reiterate the unpredictability
of the Court's position on the right not to have children, and more generally, rights involving
reproductive decisions? In either event, the application ofthe undue burden standard, or at least
the possibility of a lesser standard than strict scrutiny in cases involving temporary limitations
on a woman's right to procreate (such as the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition) raises
a clear possibility that this condition could be legally permissible.
110. See Califiano v. Azanavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174-78 (1978) (finding a statute that
discontinued certain social security benefits for recipients who spent time outside of the United
States only an incidental burden to the recipients' constitutional right to international travel).
11. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413, 1417
(1989) (citing Lyng v. Int'l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988)).
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choice.'12 Additionally, the Court has upheld other restrictions on privacy rights of
welfare recipients on grounds that the deterrent effect was either minimal or
insufficiently direct."' Hence, the government's apparent authority to infringe on at
least some privacyrights ofa welfare recipient suggests that the government's request
for family responsibility through welfare conditions could be found permissible.
Thus, this Part has suggested the following: (1) the standard utilized by the
Supreme Court to review regulations involving reproductive rights has not been
constant; (2) the Court's creation of an undue burden standard of review in Casey
may be applied in other reproductive-type cases; and (3) the restrictioh of some
privacy rights of welfare recipients reaffirms the possibility that a limitation on one's
right to procreate could also be permissible. Moreover, Part I concluded that the vast
differences between traditional and modem sterilization demanded a fresh analysis
utilizing a lesser level of scrutiny for the modem form. The next Part considers
whether the sterilization and procreation elements of the Norplant/Depo-Provera
welfare condition violate the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.
.NONSUBSlDY VS. PENALTY: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
The Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition may encounter problems with the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine. This Doctrine essentially holds that the
government cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly."4 In other words, if a
direct restriction on an individual's right is unconstitutional unless strict scrutiny is
satisfied, then indirectly causing a restraint of this right would also require the
satisfaction of strict scrutiny to be legally valid. Hence, even though the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition does not force the use of birth control on
welfare recipients, it may be found impermissible under this Doctrine because it
indirectly restricts a woman's right to procreate by conditioning a benefit on the
temporary waiver of this right.
The proposed welfare condition involves two potential rights that may require
strict scrutiny: the right not-to be sterilized and the right to procreate. The conclusions
of Parts I and II, however, argued that the appropriate standard of review for the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition was unclear due to the unique aspects of
modem sterilization and the lack of any definitive analysis of procreation rights.
While it has been suggested that strict scrutiny may not be the appropriate test for this
condition, either of the following findings by a court would likely result in the
application of strict scrutiny, and thus apossible violation under the Doctrine: (1) the
new technology of sterilization does not warrant a fresh analysis or (2) the temporary
112. Id. at 1437.
113. Id. at 1437-38 nn.90-91.
114. Whether the government has an obligation to render the benefit to the recipient is not
relevant. Rather, according to the Doctrine, the government may not bestow a benefit on the
condition that a recipient surrenders one of her constitutional rights. Nolan, supra note 5, at
17; see also Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) (allowing the state to
offer a valuable privilege on the surrendering of a constitutional right would essentially allow
the state to compel a surrender of the right).
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delay of procreation violates the principles recognized in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Carey.
115
Nonetheless, even upon one or both of these findings, the application of strict
scrutiny under the Doctrine to the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition is not
absolute. A review of the Court's application of the Doctrin6 over the last century
reveals (1) its inconsistent application and (2) the possibility that the Court will
conclude this condition only requires rational basis review," 6 and thus would be
foundpermissible." 7 The following Subpart first reviews the inconsistent application
of the Doctrine throughout its history, and then focuses the analysis of the proposed
welfare condition on the Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the Doctrine in
related subject matters.
A. Application of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The Doctrine was first established during the "Lochner Era" to protect economic
liberties under substantive due process from the threats of regulatory government."
8
While the historical standard of review for economic legislation has been rational
basis review," 9 the standard utilized today in matters involving the Doctrine are far
less clear. 2 ' The liberties protected under the Doctrine expanded after the New Deal
115. Part I argued that the new form of sterilization is inherently different from the
traditional method and that these differences warranted a fresh analysis under alesser standard.
Moreover, Part II asserted that the right to procreate has not been firmly established; the
varying standards applied in subsequent case law indicate that the choice to delay one's right
to procreate on the receipt of a benefit may also be permissible under a lesser standard. I have
recognized, however, that a court may find that these differences are not significant and apply
strict scrutiny to the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition. Although this condition may
successfully meet the strict scrutiny standard, I concede for purposes of this Note that the
application of this standard would likely result in a finding of unconstitutionality. I have
instead chosen to focus on the more promising arguments regarding the constitutionality ofthis
condition.
116. See supra text accompanying note 25.
117. My analysis reveals the clear possibility that the Supreme Court will view the
Norplant/Depo-Proverawelfare condition as social and economic legislation, which historically
has only required satisfaction of the rational basis review. Additionally, the government's
interest in encouraging family responsibility and protecting children from being bom into
homes that are not financially self-supporting will undoubtedly be considered legitimate
interests, and the welfare condition will likely be found rationally related to these governmental
interests.
118. Coale, supra note 5, at 198; see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at 597.
119. See supra text accompanying note 25.
120. As briefly'stated, if the Doctrine were literally applied as it is stated, then a condition
on a protected right would be reviewed with strict scrutiny. However, not only has rational
basis review been traditionally applied to social/economic legislation under the Doctrine, but
the Court also has increasingly upheld conditions involving-reproductive privacy issues as
social/economic legislation-requiring only rational basis review. See Richard A. Epstein,
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 5,
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in the 193 0s to include unwarranted intrusions into the private realm.' 2' However, this
transition of the Doctrine to the private realm has not been smooth, thus yielding
inconsistent results and employing inconstant factors in the analyses."
As recognized above, a strict reading of the doctrine indicates that the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition would probably be unconstitutional if the
Court decided that direct restrictions on an individual's right not to be sterilized or
an individual's right to procreate required strict scrutiny. Recently the Court,
however, has modified the Doctrine by differentiating between "direct state
interference with a protected activity" (hereinafter referred to as a "penalty") and "the
state's mere refusal to subsidize a protected activity" (hereinafter referred to as a
"nonsubsidy").'" A penalty is viewed as violating a protected right unless strict
scrutiny is satisfied, while anonsubsidy onlyrequires satisfaction of the rational basis
test to be legally permissible. 24 Because the Court has recently distinguished
6-14 (1988) (referring to the Doctrine as "mysterious" because of the varying application in
different contexts); see also Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1415-16 (arguing that the Doctrine as
applied "is riven with inconsistencies").
121. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 597; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-10
(1963) (introducing the use of the Doctrine in the area of public assistance programs).
122. Friedman, supra note 52, at 645 (asserting that the Doctrine lacks a clear test due in
part to the aberrant shift in focus of the Doctrine); see also Nolan, supra note 5, at 33-35
(evaluating the permissibility of a condition under the Doctrine by considering varying theories
of germaneness, inalienability, and coercion). The most recent test utilized by the Supreme
Court to determine whether the Doctrine has been violated is the penalty/nonsubsidy
distinction. See Coale, supra note 5, at 200. This theory is discussed further in the text
following this footnote.
123. Roberts, supra note 5, at 936; see also Coale, supra note 5, at 198-203 (discussing
cases concerning the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction in the area of state-sponsored medical
care).
124. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1415. The lack of definitiveness as to the distinction
between a penalty and a nonsubsidy has received criticism. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9,
at 602 (stating that "generating the appropriate baselines from which to distinguish subsidies
from penalties is exceptionally difficult"). In fact, various theories have been proposed to
replace the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction. Id. at 595 (advocating the replacement of the
penalty/nonsubsidy test under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine with a query as to
"whether, under the provision at issue, the government has constitutionally sufficient
justifications for affecting [the] constitutionally protected interests'); see also Charles R.
Bogle, "Unconscionable" Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public
Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 193,216-18 (1994) (discussing proposals by Kenneth
Simons and Seth Kreimer for establishing a baseline to determine "whether a proposed
conditional benefit is an offer or a threat"); Sullivan, supra note I 11, at 1499-1500 (arguing
that strict review should be applied to "any government benefit condition whose primary
purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise of a preferred
constitutional liberty"). While the criticism regarding the lack of clarity in the distinction
between a penalty and a nonsubsidy has some merit, each of these proposals has also received
criticism. See Bogle, supra, at 217 (finding the baseline theory "speculative"); see also id. at
216 n.1 12 (citing David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
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nonsubsidy from penalty conditions in a number of cases involving the reproductive
decisions of indigent women, the focus of the analysis of the Norplant/Depo-Provera
welfare condition will comprise of this differentiation.'" Moreover, the similar nature
of the abortion funding cases and family cap laws to the Norplant/Depo-Provera
welfare condition should be given the greatest weight in the analysis of the welfare
condition.
1. The Abortion Funding Cases
Over the last twenty-three years, the Supreme Court has applied the
nonsubsidy/penalty distinction in three cases involving the funding of childbirth
services but not abortion services. 12 The Court expressed that "there is a basic
difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy."'27
Applying this rationale to each case, the Court has upheld the state's policy choice
to encourage childbirth over abortion by limiting the availability of funds only to
childbirth services rather than abortion services.1
28
The Court in 1977 first addressed this issue in Maher v. Roe, 29 which involved an
indigent woman bringing suit on equal protection grounds against a Connecticut
Welfare Department regulation that funded childbirth expenses but limited the
availability of Medicaid benefits to first trimester abortions that were "medically
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675,701 n. 100 (1992)) (calling
Sunstein's alternative approach "too vague to be helpful"); id. at 218-20 (referring to Sullivan's
neutrality theory as "radical" and her "notion of rights" as being outside the usual framework
of "rights as individual protections against government intrusion"). Thus, because the
penalty/nonsubsidy distinction is the mainstream constitutional approach for determining
whether the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine has been violated, and because no clear
consensus exists as to which proposed approach would be most effective (or even more
effective than the current approach) for determining the permissibility of conditional benefits,
the penalty/nonsubsidy test is viewed as the most likely approach to be applied by the Supreme
Court with regard to the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition. Sunstein, supra note 9, at
601.
125. While most ofthe analysis in this Note focuses on the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction,
the principles advanced in the other theories of germaneness, coercion, and inalienability are
incorporated into the analysis. In any event, many legal scholars have criticized all of these
theories as determinants of the Doctrine's applicability. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 11, at
1419-22 (asserting that each of these theories yields inconsistent results and, thus, proposes a
new, more systematic approach to matters implicating this Doctrine). See also supra text
accompanying note 124.
126. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
127. Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.
128. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200; see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 317-18; Maher, 432 U.S. at
474.
129.432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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necessary."'30 The Court, however, held that the regulation did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause-a state's policy choice to pay the expenses incident to childbirth
did not require it to pay expenses incident to nontherapeutic abortions. '' Moreover,
the Court rejected the woman's assertion that "financial need alone identifies a
suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis."'3 The Court reasoned that
making childbirth a more attractive alternative may affect a woman's decision, but it
does not impose any new restrictions on a woman's ability to have an abortion.'
Rather, the "difficultly,] and in some cases, perhaps, [the] impossib[ility,] for some
women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by [this]
regulation."" Accordingly, the regulation was not viewed as a penalty, and thus only
rational basis review was applied. Further, the "state's strong interest in protecting
the potential life of the fetus". was found to be a sufficient reason to uphold this
regulation.'
Three years later, in 1980, the Supreme Court addressed a similar regulation, the
Hyde Amendment,1 6 in Harris v. MCRea.137 The issue raised here, however, was
whether a state participating in the Medicaid program was required under Title XIX
"to fund [the cost of] medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement
is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment."'3 The Court analogized this case to
Maher 39 and reaffirmed their finding that a state making "a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion, and ... implement[ing] that judgment by the allocation of
public funds" did not violate the protected rights recognized in Roe v. Wade."
Additionally, the Court restated that "poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect
130. Id. at 466-67. In other words, the regulation prohibited the funding of abortions that
were not medically necessary.
131. Id. at 474-77.
132. Id. at 471.
133. Id. at 474. "An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as
a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be
dependent on private sources for the service[s] she desires." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 478.
136. In 1965 the Medicaid program was created under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act to provide federal financial aid to states opting to compensate certain costs of medical
treatment for indigents. Harris v. McRea, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). The Hyde Amendments
in 1967 "prohibited... the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under
the Medicaid program except under certain specified circumstances." Id. at 302. The Supreme
Court in Harris considered constitutional and statutory challenges to the validity of the Hyde
Amendments. Id. at 300.
137. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
138. Id. at 307.
139. "The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher,
places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest." Id. at 315.
140. Id. at 314 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
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classification" 4 '-the state has no obligation to remove obstacles preventing an
individual from exercising a protected right that was not of their own creation.'
Most recently in 1991, the Supreme Court once again addressed this issue of
providing for childbirth expenses, but not abortion costs, in Rust v. Sullivan. 43 The
case concerned the legal validityofSection 1008 of the Public Health Services Act,'"
which prohibited the use of federal funds for the Act's Title X family-planning
services when the utilized method was abortion. 45 An amendment to the Act in 1988
added additional prohibitions to Title X projects.'" Projects including counseling,
referrals, and other activities that advocated abortion as a family planning method
were required to maintain "an objective integrity and independence from the
prohibited [abortion] activities" by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and
accounting records.147
The Court upheld these regulations and stated that they did not "'create [any]
affirmative legal barriers to access to abortion."' "' Moreover, the Court reclaimed its
authority to subsidize family planning services that will lead to childbirth, while
declining to promote or encourage abortion, from Maher.'4 The Court stressed yet
141. Harris, 448 U.S. at 323.
142. Id. at316. The Court affirned its rationale applied in Maher v. Roe by reiterating that
"it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range ofprotected choices." Id.
This basic principle has also been recognized in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490,507 (1989) (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 196 (1989)) (stating "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government may not deprive the individual").
143. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6.
145. Id. § 300a-6
146.42 C.F.R. §§ 59.2, 59.5, 59.7-. 10.
147. Rust, 500 U.S. at 180-81.
148. Id. at 182 (quoting New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401,411 (1989) (citing Webster,
492 U.S. at 509-10 (1989))). The Court compared the prohibitions in the instant case to
Webster and determined that the restrictions permitted on the performance of abortions in
Webster were "substantially greater in impact than the regulations challenged in the instant
matter." Id. (citing Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 411). Moreover, the Court rejected the view that the
"[regulations'] restrictions on the subsidization ofabortion-related speech... [were to be held
to unconstitutionally] condition the receipt of a benefit, . . . Title X funding, on the
relinquishment of a constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy and
counseling." Id. at 196. The Court based its conclusion on FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364 (1984), that held these regulations "do not force [anyone] to give up [their]
abortion-related speech; [rather] they merely require that [such activity be kept] separate and
distinct from [the activities of the Title X project]." Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
149. The Court in the instant case referred to its decision inMaher, where it held that the
government may "make a valuejudgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and.., implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds." Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-93 (citing Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)).
2002]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
again that "the government choos[ing] to subsidize one protected right [does not
mean they] must subsidize analogous counterpart rights"; 4 nor is it a constitutional
violation for the government to "selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.'.'
Accordingly, the Court concurred with the finding in Harris that "' [a] refusal to fund
protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty'
on that activity""--meaning that the denial of funds for abortion services was
considered a nonsubsidy requiring satisfaction of only rational basis review.
Like the abortion funding cases, the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition
could be interpreted as the government making a "value judgment," but in this
instance to promote familyresponsibility, rather than childbirth. Inboth instances, the
judgment is based on what is in the best interest of the public. Moreover, the
consistent finding by the Court that none of the abortion funding cases "place[d
impermissible] obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of
choice"'5 should apply to the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition.
Some opponents, however, have asserted this type of welfare condition varies from
the abortion funding cases because "women on welfare would be required to pay
more than wealthier women to exercise a constitutional right."" 4 As discussed further
in Part flI.B. below, the welfare conditions do not inhibit a woman's ability to have
a child; rather, "[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to
enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product
not of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but rather of her indigency."'55
150. Id. at 194. The Court, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540
(1983), also applied this rationale and rejected this notion that government must subsidize
analogous counterpart rights. Id. at 550.
15 1. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The Court specifically announced the broad authority that the
government has in defining limits to programs publicly funded. Id. at 193-94.
152. Id. at 193 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)).
153. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; see also Rust, 500 U.S. at 182 (recounting the holding of
the Second Circuit, in New York v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1989), that Title X
regulations did not impermissibly burden a woman's right to an abortion by favoring
childbirth); Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (noting that Roe v. Wade does not prohibit the state from
"mak[ing] a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortions, and ... implement[ing] that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.").
154. Coale, supra note 5, at 209-10.
The programs upheld in Harris and Maher did not make a poor woman
pay more to exercise her right to an abortion than a woman able to earn a
subsistence income. They just made a poor woman pay the going market
price for an abortion, which is the same price that other women pay. But
a Norplant bonus makes a poor woman forego $1000 in consumption
possibilities to exercise her right to not take Norplant that a wealthier
woman does not have to forego to exercise her right.
Id.
155. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 316). The validity of the
opponent's argument in regard to a bonus involving cash incentives is discussed further in the
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The next section further establishes this point by arguing that the growing
implementation of the family caps in state welfare programs indicates the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition should be analyzed analogously to the
family cap and abortion funding cases.
2. The Family Cap Laws
Traditionally, welfare recipients received an increase in benefits when they had a
child (or another child) while on welfare. In the last decade, however, states have
incorporated family caps into their state welfare programs. Family caps basically
eliminate the increase in benefits for children born to recipients while they are on
welfare.'56 This conception ofa family cap law was originally upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1970 when it declared that a cap on the total amount of benefits an Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") 157 family can receive is permissible
regardless of the size of the family."' Although the AFDC typically provided an
increase in benefits for a child born to an AFDC recipient, the AFDC also contained
a provision that permitted the implementation of family cap laws. 59 Specifically,
under the AFDC, states could bypass the federal requirements and implement their
own reform measures upon approval by the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS"). 6
In 1992, the New Jersey reform measure, the Family Development Program
("FDP"), was the first state plan approved by HHS that included the implementation
of a family cap.' 6 ' The family cap aspect of the FDP eliminated the awarding of
additional benefits for the birth of children to families already receiving AFDC
benefits. 62 The intent of the New Jersey family cap law, as for most state family caps,
following section, Part III.B.2.
156. Family cap laws are implemented at the state level, and thus their exact application
varies according to relevant state law.
157.42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2001). Until 1996, the AFDC was the main federal
welfare program that provided direct cash assistance to eligible needy. Id. All individuals were
entitled to state assistance, provided they satisfied the eligibility requirements. Id. A state
received federal funds on the condition that its AFDC administration plan complied with the
federal guidelines. Id.
158. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-87 (1970). The Court concluded a
Maryland program that placed a ceiling on the welfare benefits that any one family could
receive passed the rational basis test. Id. at 472-73, 487.
159.42 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West Supp. 2001).
160. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (West Supp. 2001).
161. Robyn R. Bender, Note, Implementation ofth e Family Cap: Modelsfor Integrating
Family Planning Services, 4 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 379, 381 (1997).
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.5 (West 1993) (repealed 1997). The elimination of
increased benefits for a child did not apply under the family cap law if the child was born
within ten months of the recipient's application for the AFDC benefits. Id. The ten-month grace
period was intended to provide for those children conceived prior to the recipient's application
for AFDC benefits. However, if an individual had received AFDC benefits within ten months
before the birth of a child, the FDP did not grant an increase of bonuses for that child. Bender,
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is to "promote family stability" by encouraging recipients to make responsible
childbearing decisions and to be self-sufficient. 6
Since the implementation of the FDP, the District Court of New Jersey held that
"the [f]amily [c]ap provision of the FDP does not violate any statutory or
constitutional mandate."' Moreover, mirroring the reasoning applied in Maher,
Harris, and Rust, the court concluded that
the family cap provision does not attempt to fetter or constrain the welfare
mother's right to bear as many children as she chooses, but simply requires her to
find a way to pay for her progeny's care. This is not discrimination; rather, this is
the reality known to so many working families who provide for their children
without any expectation of outside assistance.
165
Additionally, by August of 1996, only four years after the family cap provision of
FDP was approved, family cap laws in eighteen states were also approved. 6 6 While
the family cap plans vary to some degree from state to state, most of them do not
provide any increase in benefits for additional children born while the parents are
recipients of welfare. 67
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996168 yielded a
dramatic change in welfare laws byreplacing the AFDC program with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") welfare reform.169 Under TANF states
receive a lump sum of federal funds to set up their own welfare program. 70 Unlike
supra note 161, at 381 (citing § 44:10-3.5; N.J. ADmiN. CODE tit. 10, § 82-1.2(b) (1992)).
Additionally, "FDP provided that an AFDC family would receive benefits through an increased
earned income disregard up to fifty percent of the monthly AFDC grant, adjusted for family
size." Id. (citing § 44:10-3.5).
163. Bender, supra note 161, at 381 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3.7(c) (West 1993)
(repealed 1997)).
164. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1015 (D.N.J. 1995).
165. Id.
166. Bender, supra note 161, at 381 (citing State Welfare Reform Waivers on file at the
Center for Law & Social Policy). The HHS has approved the incorporation of a family cap in
the welfare reform programs of the following states: Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 395
n.37. Additionally, all of these states, except Wisconsin, have continued to keep their waiver
programs under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ('CTANF") or have implemented
their program directly under TANF. Id. at 395 n.38.
167. Id. at 383. However, in most states these newly born children, who are not covered
under TANF, will still be eligible for Medicaid assistance. Id. at 384.
168. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West Supp. 2001).
169. Bender, supra note 161, at 380-83; see also Greg J. Duncan & Gretchen Caspary,
Welfare Dynamics and the 1996 Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
605, 608 (1997).
170. Laura C. Conway, Note, Will Procedural Due Process Survive AfterAid to Families
with Dependant Children Is Gone?, 4 GEo. J. ON FIGIMNG POvERTY 209, 212 (1996).
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under AFDC, HHS only determines that the state has provided them with the
necessary information; HHS does not approve or disapprove state plans. 7 ' The
authority of states to design their own welfare programs under TANF further suggests
family caps will continue to be implemented as part of state welfare plans. Moreover,
under TANF, individuals meeting the eligibility requirements are no longer entitled
to assistance like they were under the AFDC's principle of entitlement."
Additionally, the restrictions and limited availability of federal assistance that
states must sustain under TANF suggests that even more ambitious programs than the
family cap plan will be proposed. The following are some new prohibitions and
restrictions that TANF already requires states to follow: (1) TANF does not include
a mandatory time that states must offer assistance to needy families; (2) states are
prohibited from using TANF funds to provide assistance to certain families; 74 and
(3) the maximum time a family can receive assistance via TANF is 60 months or five
years. '7
Under TANF there is not a requirement that states with family cap plans offer
recipients family planning services, though states are not prohibited from providing
these services."7 The states, through family cap laws, are essentially "trying to stop
women from pursuing their right to have a child by denying them necessary aid if
they exercise it."'" Hence, the success of the family caps are dependent on the
recipients thinking ahead and realizing that they will not receive any additional
benefits if they have another child while they are receiving assistance. Inevitably
these plans will encourage the use of birth control by recipients. In this respect, the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare plan may offer more hope of success because
recipients are given a direct incentive to act responsibly. If they agree to take either
Norplant or Depo-Provera while they are receiving assistance-that is, they choose
to act responsibly-then they will be rewarded. Additionally, the Norplant/Depo-
Provera proposal fits within the same reasoning applied in the abortion funding and
family cap cases-the encouragement of family responsibility by advocating the use
of contraception does not prevent a recipient from having a child while on welfare.
The recipient is not penalized;7  they are left in the same place as they were before,
171. Id. at 212 n.48.
172. Duncan & Caspary, supra note 169, at 608.
173. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604(a)(1) (West Supp. 2001).
174. Id. § 608(a) (West Supp. 2001) (including prohibiting states from using TANF funds
to assist families without minor children, and to teen parents not attending school).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999). The 60-month period does not have to be
consecutive; rather, a recipient is cut off from assistance once she has received assistance for
a total of five years throughout her life. Id. Extensions of assistance may be granted, and this
time limit does not apply to state-funded assistance. Id. §§ 608(a)(7)(C), (F).
176. Bender, supra note 161, at 384.
177. Friedman, supra note 52, at 642.
178. Some may argue that women choosing not to take Norplant or Depo-Provera are
penalized because they lose an additional benefit. However, the apparent permissibility of
family cap laws, which essentially deny recipients additional benefits for children born while
their parents are on welfare, implies either that this is not a penalty or that penalties are
permissible in some instances.
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and their own financial problems remain the only thing impeding their ability to have
children.
3. Other Public Assistance Cases Utilizing
the Nonsubsidy/Penalty Distinction
The above review of the abortion funding cases and family cap laws reveals that
it is conceivable that the Supreme Court would extend its rationale to support the
implementation of Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare conditions as a nonpenalty. The
Court's application of the nonsubsidy/penalty distinction, however, does not always
yield findings of permissible government restrictions. Rather, in some instances, the
Court has found that imposing a condition on the receipt of a benefit impermissibly
penalizes an individual exercising a protected right.
During the middle of the twentieth century, the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine was extended to cover conditions involving individual rights. As mentioned
above, the primary focus of these cases was to determine "whether conditions
'penalize' or 'deter' the exercise of constitutional rights."' 79 The Court in three cases
struck down regulations as impermissible, coercive penalties.'80 First, in 1958, the
Court in Speiser v. Randall'8 ' held that offering World War II veterans a property tax
exemption on the condition that they take a loyalty oath was an impermissible state
requirement." The Court viewed this condition as penalizing the veterans for their
speech and emphasized that the potential deterrent effect on speech would be
unacceptable."
In 1963, the Court employed the same view against conditions imposing a
restriction on an individual's protected right in Sherbert v. Verner. ' In this case, the
Court held that the withholding of unemployment compensation from a woman who
lost her job because she refused to work on the Sabbath violated her First
Amendment right. 5 Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court, viewed this
condition as coercive and accented that "the pressure upon [Mrs. Sherbert] to forego
th[e] practice [of her religion] is unmistakable.' ' 6 Moreover, the Court in 1969 in
Shapiro v. Thompson"8 7 ruled that conditioning the receipt of welfare benefits on
durational residency requirements required strict scrutiny. 8 In Shapiro, residents
who had only lived in-state for less than one year were denied welfare benefits."89 The
179. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1433.
180. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v.
Jordan, 414 U.S. 651 (1974) (overruling the Eleventh Amendment holding of Shapiro); see
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
181. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
182. Id. at 518-19.
183. Id.
184. 374 U.S. 398,410 (1963).
185. Id.
186. Sullivan, supra note I 1, at 1434 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404).
187. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
188. Id. at 634.
189. Id. at 623-25.
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Court found that this restriction penalized these residents by denying them their
fundamental right to interstate travel.190
Although the above three cases suggest that benefits offered conditionally on the
waiver of a protected right would not be permissible, subsequent case law involving
conditions based on the waiver of an individual's right(s) have not yielded the same
results. For instance, in 1983 the Court inRegan v. Taxation With Representation'9'
"upheld [a] federal income tax [prohibiting] nonprofit organizations from using tax-
deductible contributions for lobbying activities," which essentially meant that those
organizations would have to abstain from certain activity in order to get a benefit."9
Despite recognition that a direct ban of this activity would require strict scrutiny, the
Court applied only rational basis review-referencing the conclusion in the abortion
funding cases that a "decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right
does not infringe the right."'93
In 1988, the Court again followed the reasoning of Regan and the abortion funding
cases, upholding the ban of federal food stamps for welfare recipients who had a
household member on strike in Lyng v. International Union, UAW. 94 More
specifically, the Court ignored the parallel to Speiser and differentiated Lyng from
Sherbert on the ground that the right of religious belief is different than the rights of
speech and association.9 The Court instead emphasized the unlikely deterrent effect
and that this restriction involved no "coercive governmental interference with specific
individual rights."'
196
Many legal scholars have had problems reconciling the classification of Sherbert
and Shapiro as impermissible penalties while, at the same time, concluding the
abortion funding cases and family cap laws do not impose impermissible penalties.
9 7
However, the subsequent use of the nonsubsidy/penalty distinction in cases like
190. Id. at 634. The durational residency requirement was originally thought to violate
equal protection since those living in-state for less than a year were treated differently than
those living in-state for more than a year. Id. at 632-33. However, because "recent immigrants
were not otherwise a suspect class, the penalty-on-interstate-travel reasoning explains the strict
scrutiny applied in the case." Sullivan, supra note 11, at 1434 n.76 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 631).
191. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
192. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1441 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(D), 501(c)(3), (4)
(1982)).
193. Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
194.485 U.S. 360 (1988) (rejecting the claim that this restriction violated an individual's
right to free speech and association under the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine). But see
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking the regulation that denied
federal funds for public broadcasting stations that engaged in editorializing as coercive). The
Court in League of Women Voters, however, did distinguish this case from the prior conditions
that had been upheld. The Court regarded this condition as a "ban" or "restriction," rather than
a viable option. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1442 (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S.
at 391-94).
195. Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1438-39.
196. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 368-69.
197. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 111, at 1439.
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Regan and Lyng to uphold conditions involving individual rights signals a strong
possibility that this same reasoning will be applied in cases involving the
Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition.
Moreover, there are some obvious differences between the impermissible penalty
cases and the permissible nonsubsidy cases. First, the nonsubsidy cases, unlike the
penalty cases, have dealt with the similar subject matter of reproductive decisions.
Second, the former cases involve a clear obstacle to the exercise of the recipient's
fundamental right, which does not exist in the latter cases. For example, in Sherbert,
the woman whose only available job requires working on the Sabbath can either break
her religious beliefs and work, or she can keep her religious beliefs and be left with
no means of income. Hence, the woman is left in a difficult position regardless of
which option she takes. 9 The results in the abortion funding cases, however, do not
alter the position the recipient was in prior to the optional condition.' Women who
want an abortion are still able to have one; the government just will not pay for it.
Similarly with the Norplant/Depo-Proverawelfare condition, recipients may still have
children while on welfare; the government just will not give the recipient any extra
benefits if they do.
Even if women not opting to take Norplant or Depo-Provera are left in a worse
position, the legality of the family cap laws indicates that this would not necessarily
invalidate the condition. The family cap laws leave recipients who have children
while on welfare in a worse position by eliminating the increase in benefits that
welfare recipients traditionally were entitled to. Hence, technically the family cap law
is an obstacle in a recipient's ability to have children while on welfare. The obstacle
resulting from the family cap laws suggests that in at least some cases leaving a
recipient in a so-called "worse position" is permissible. Moreover, one could argue
that the denial of an extra benefit (the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition)
would not leave a recipient in a worse position than being denied an increase in
welfare payments for additional children (the family cap law). Hence, if welfare
conditions are analogized to the family cap laws, as they should be, then seemingly
this alleged worse position would be found permissible, provided it is no worse than
the family cap laws.
Furthermore, the penalty cases, includingSpeiser, Sherbert, andShapiro, occurred
in the 1960s when the penalty/nonsubsidy distinction was first being applied, while
the nonsubsidy cases, includingMaher, Harris, Rust, Regan, and Lyng, represent the
Court's application throughout the 1970s to present day.2" As noted earlier, the
specific weight the Court has given to different factors in their analysis of conditional
benefits is not clear. What is clear, however, is that the Court and Congress over the
last four decades both appear to be more accepting of regulations containing
198. If she works on the Sabbath, she is compromising her religious beliefs. However, if
she refrains from infringing on her religious beliefs, she will not be able to work and will not
collect unemployment benefits.
199. No woman is denied the opportunity to have an abortion. Whether or not Medicaid
offers assistance for childbirth does not worsen or further impair her financial situation, or hurt
her ability to obtain an abortion.
200. The phrase "Court's application" refers to the recent trend of upholding conditions
involving individual rights as a nonsubsidy, rather than as a coercive penalty.
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conditional benefits and funding of reproductive matters. Moreover, in an analysis
of the proposed welfare condition, great weight should be given to its similarity with
the abortion funding cases and family cap laws. The next Subpart reviews the
potential approval of the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition and, more
specifically, in what instances this condition may be legally valid.
B. Permissible Norplant/Depo-Provera Welfare Conditions
The idea that states may set up a welfare plan that directly encourages the use of
birth control by female welfare participants is not a novel idea. Every state currently
offers indigent women some financial assistance in obtaining Norplant. °t Moreover,
welfare legislation mandating the use of Norplant or offering recipients a cash
incentive on the condition that they take Norplant has already been proposed in
several states.2 2 Mandating or conditioning the use of birth control has not yet been
implemented into state welfare programs. However, even legal scholars who protest
the constitutionality ofthese proposals recognize that the growing discontent with the
welfare system may lead to additional proposals.2 3 Moreover, the implementation of
family cap laws and the move from AFDC to the new welfare reform under TANF
signals that the country is experimenting with new, ambitious welfare programs.
Finally, the advancement of Depo-Provera now heightens the attractiveness ofa birth
control incentive program by giving women the flexibility to choose between
Norplant and Depo-Provera.
While proposals for mandating the use of the birth control may arise, the
proposition and analysis in this Note have been limited to the constitutionality of a
proposal that provides women with the option to take birth control in return for an
additional benefit. The Norplant Depo-Provera welfare proposal does not require
women to take birth control on the receipt of welfare funds in general; rather an extra
benefit, in addition to a recipient's normal payments, is being offered as an incentive
to encourage recipients to act responsiblyby taking either Norplant or Depo-Provera.
The bonus could take the form of increased welfare payments, exclusion from the
family cap law, or an extension in the length of time an individual could receive
assistance. Additionally, the ability to remove Norplant at anytime and the temporary
effectiveness of Depo-Provera allows women to opt for the bonus for the whole time
they are on welfare, for only part of the time, or for none of the time.
201. Roberts, supra note 5, at 933.
202. Legislation mandating the use of Norplant for some women was proposed in
Mississippi, and a cash bonus incentive program on the condition of Norplant being taken was
proposed in Kansas and Louisiana. Coale, supra note 5, at 195-96. None of these programs,
however, were passed. Id. at 196.
203. See, e.g., id. at 196.
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1. The Objective
The purpose of the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition would be to take the
family cap laws not only a step further but to achieve the goals of the family cap laws
in a more effective, direct manner. The specific objective of the Norplant/Depo-
Provera welfare condition is for welfare recipients to act responsibly and refrain from
having children while they are unable to support themselves without government
assistance. The proposal is not singling out a class of people or suggesting that these
recipients should not have children; rather, the proposal is merely encouraging those
on welfare to make the responsible decision to wait to have children until they are
financially self-supporting. In the end, the choice to procreate remains with the
recipient at all times. If the recipient opts to take Norplant or Depo-Provera, the
option to stop using the birth control and procreate is always available.2"
2. The Bonus
The type of bonus offered to recipients on the condition that they take Norplant or
Depo-Provera may affect the probability of whether the plan is foundpermissible. For
instance, some opponents assert cash incentives would violate the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine as a coercive measure."5 They contend recipients would feel
compelled to opt for the bonus, rather than forego the monetary gain and fall into a
lower economic rank.' While this argument on its face has some merit, in practice
this argument does not necessarily result in conditions being found impermissible.
The whole purpose of the family cap laws is to encourage women to stop having
children while they are on welfare. The basic difference between the family cap laws
and Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition is that the former is indirectly telling
women to use contraception while the latter is directly providing women with the
incentive to use contraception. Hence, since both plans have the same interest and
essentially the same means for obtaining their goal, it seems very plausible that this
more direct encouragement of taking contraception and being family-responsible
would also be found acceptable.
However, even if cash incentives are found to be an impermissible burden, a state
could still provide women with the incentive to take Norplant or Depo-Provera by
assuring them that they would be exempted from the family cap law if they did
204. After the removal of the Norplant device, fertility will return at normal rate within
months. See supra text accompanying note 64. Additionally, the effectiveness ofDepo-Provera
lasts three months. American Academy of Family Physicians, supra note 2. After the last
injection of Depo-Provera, most women are able to procreate within a year. Pharmacia &
Upjohn, About Depo-Provera, available at
http://www.depo-provera.con/consumer/about-depo/faq.htm (last visited Oct. 1,2001). Hence,
women's ability to procreate after choosing to opt out of the conditional program may be
delayed generally no more than one year.
205. See, e.g., Coale, supra note 5, at 208-210.
206. Id.
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become pregnant due to an error in the contraception. 7 In this situation, the woman
may choose to protect herself from an unexpected pregnancy by opting to take
Norplant or Depo-Provera. Alternatively, she may choose to take another form of
birth control or none at all; however, the already existing family cap laws would
apply if she had another child. This plan may prove to be successful against
traditional arguments by opponents because a woman is not left in a worse position;
if she decides not to opt for the exemption, then she is subject to the family cap laws
as if there was no option at all. Additionally, this plan is particularly attractive
because it encourages the use of birth.control, but at the same time provides
assistance to children born due to contraceptive error.
A final possible bonus might be to expand the current sixty-month time limit for
welfare assistance under TANF. Although opponents still could argue that recipients
not opting to take Norplant or Depo-Provera would be left in a worse financial
situation because they will not have extended assistance, such an argument is far
weaker in this situation. Even under the current welfare laws, states are given the
ability to extend welfare assistance beyond the sixty-month time limit in certain
situations. Hence, the extension of time would not be limited only to users of
Norplant or Depo-Provera; rather, the Norplant/Depo-Provera users would be an
exception to the sixty-month limit rule similar to the other exceptions available to this
rule under TANF, including the hardship and minor child exceptions. 201
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to address the most common constitutional challenges to
the legal permissibility of the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition and to
present viable counterarguments that might be utilized to advocate its legal validity.
In regard to the sterilization element of the plan, new birth control technology differs
considerably from the traditional idea of sterilization and thus warrants a fresh
analysis. Moreover, the analysis concerning procreation rights is inconsistent,
producing various standards without expressing any clear understanding of what
makes some privacy rights more basic than others. This analysis of reproductive
rights has further failed to clearly assert when a government intrusion would be
warranted.
While the incorporation of this new technology in welfare programs raises some
interesting questions concerning traditionally protected rights, the main challenge to
the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare condition is the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine. The permissibility of this proposed welfare condition will most likely hinge
on whether the rationale utilized in the abortion funding cases, family cap laws, and
the other nonsubsidy cases discussed will be extended to include this welfare
condition plan. If this rationale is extended, the government's interest in promoting
family responsibility by directly encouraging the use of Norplant or Depo-Provera
through a welfare condition could likewise be found constitutionally conceivable.
Accordingly, this Note has established that the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare
condition may be constitutionally permissible for the following reasons: (1)
207. This bonus type is directed toward states that have a family cap plan.
208.42 U.S.C.A. §§ 608(a)(7)(B), (C) (West Supp. 2001).
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sterilization through the use of Norplant or Depo-Provera is sufficiently different
from the form of sterilization considered in Skinner v. Oklahoma, and thus this
modem form of sterilization is not covered by the Skinner ruling, (2) the variability
and inconsistency in the privacy/reproductive rights cases provide a clear possibility
that a lesser standard, such as the undue burden standard adopted in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, could be applied to the Norplant/Depo-Provera welfare
condition, and that this condition would be found constitutionally permissible; and
(3) the practice of allowing reproductive regulation based on valuejudgments serves
as a stepping stone for the Supreme Court to promote the Norplant/Depo-Provera
welfare condition by advocating the need for family responsibility.
